[1]Yue Lai, Tianzhu Cheng. Poverty Alleviation Programs, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth-A General Equilibrium Model,2014年第12期,Computer Modelling and New Technologies(EI-Compendex) [2]赖玥. 财政激励对县域经济增长的影响——基于中国县级面板数据的实证分析,广东商学院学报,2013年第5期.(CSSCI) [3]赖玥、成天柱. 财政扶贫的效率损失——基于财政激励视角的县级面板数据分析,经济问题,2014年4月. (CSSCI) [4]赖玥. 财政分权与经济增长:委托-代理视角下的模型,统计与决策,2014年6月. (CSSCI) [5]Yue Lai. Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and economic growth(财政分权、财政收支配置与经济增长). Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Public Economics and Management.2010,Vol 9,9-14.(ISTP检索) [6]Yue Lai. Commercial Briberies in Pharmaceutical Markets of China: A Game with Incomplete Information. Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Public Economics and Management.2010,Vol 6, 11-15.(ISTP检索) [7]邹薇、赖玥. 药品市场中商业贿赂的经济学分析:一个不完美信息的博弈模型,武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2010年第5期, 第761~769页.(CSSCI) [8]Yue Lai, Tianzhu Cheng. Intergovernmental Allocation of Public Resources, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth(政府间公共资源配置、财政分权与经济增长). International Journal of Information Engineering and Electronic Business. 2011, Vol. 3, 8-15. [9]Yue Lai, Tianzhu Cheng. Government Expenditures, Transfer Payments and Economic Growth(政府支出、转移支付和经济增长). Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted Computing . 2011, 1196-1199. [10] Tianzhu Cheng, Yue Lai & Sheng Dai. Why Personal Relations Matters: Analysis Based on a Game between Pharmaceuticals and Hospitals. The Ninth Wuhan International Conference on E-business. 2010, Vol.3, 2462-2466.(ISTP检索) [11]赖玥,黄柳芬.商业银行贷记卡业务中的逆向选择——来自农业银行柳南支行的证据.广西工学院学报,2012年第4期,第89-93页. [12]赖玥、成天柱. 基于医药博弈模型的人际关系收益考量[J]. 广西工学院学报,2011年第4期,第79-83页. [13]赖玥. 西部地区智力外流的模型分析. 广西工学院学报,2005年第4期, 第92-95页. |